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In the Supreme Court 
of the 
State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION \ 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
PlaintiJff, 
CONTINENTAL EM:SCO COThi-
p ANY, a division of YOUNGSTOWN ( 
SHEET AND TUBE CO:MP ANY, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
and Cross Appellant, I Case No. 8950 
-vs.-
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, 
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRES-
TON, partners, doing business under 
the firm name of DAVIS OIL COM-
PANY, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT and CROSS APPELLANT, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMANY, a division of 
YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE COMPANY 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be designated in this brief as fol-
lows: Appellant Stanton Transportation Company, as 
"Stanton"; Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross Appellant 
Continental Emsco Company, a division of Youngstown 
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Sheet and Tube Company, as "Emsco"; and defendants, 
Appellants and Respondents, Marvin Davis, Jack Davis, 
Jean Davis, Joan Preston, partners, doing business under 
the firm name of Davis Oil Company, as "Davis." The 
Walker-Wilson Drilling Company will sometimes be re-
ferred to herein as "Walker-Wilson" or as "Driller." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief contains an answer to the brief filed here-
in in the appeal of Davis from the judgment of the trial 
court holding that Emsco is entitled to a Jiechanics' Lien 
in the amount of $4,158.64 for rock-drilling bits furnished 
hy Emsco to tlie Driller and also is a cross appeal by 
Emsco from the judgment of the trial court holding that 
Emsco was not entitled to a lien for 1naterials furnished 
other than the rock drilling bits above referred to having 
a value of $2,620.10. 
STATEMENT OF F ... -\_CTS 
References to the Clerk's files and transcripts of the 
hearings will be designated herein in the sruue manner as 
in the brief of Davis. 
With respect to the appeal of Davis against the judg-
Inent in favor of En1sco for the rock drilling bits, Emsco 
does not controvert DaYis · Staten1ent of facts except the 
following state1nent: 
"'The rock bits did not bec01ue part of the im-
proveinent of well and the clai1u of En1sco is only 
for the service given by tl1e rented bits." (Page 
5 of Davis' brief). 
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E1nsco contend that the statement of facts by Davi~ 
with respect to the part played by the rock bits in the 
drilling operations, including the extent to which they 
became a part of the well, and the terms under which 
they were furnished is incomplete, and that the following 
facts also appear from the record: 
In the process of drilling an oil and gas well, it is 
the rock bit which actually does the drilling, that is, the 
teeth of the bit cut the hole as it rotates at the end of the 
drill stem. ( T R A pp. 67-68). 
Under the terms of the agreement under which the 
bits were furnished in this case, the driller had the right 
to use the bits until they had served their useful like as 
instruments of drilling, that is, until the cutter teeth 
were worn away or they became "dull." (Emsco's Ex-
hibits A(A); B through F; A-4; A-9; A-12; A-13; A-16; 
A-17; TRAp. 71). 
The charge for the rock drilling bits, upon which the 
lien claim of Emsco is based, is for the bit and the prom-
ise of the customer to return the same after it becomes 
dull and the customer is through with it. ( TRA p. 71) 
The bits for which Emsco claims a lien were actually 
used in the making or drilling the oil and gas well in 
question. ('TRA pp. 67-74; Emsco's Exhibits A(A), B 
thru F, B-1). The claim of Emsco is for the service of th1-~ 
bits furnished in making the hole which included a con-
sumption or wearing away of the teeth of the bits ( TRA 
pp. 63-64) and the value of this use of the bits was 
$4,158.64 (TRB pp. 106-107; Emsco's Exhibits A-4; A-9; 
A-12; A-13; A-16; A-17; B through F; A(A) and 0), 
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which sum is consistent with the usual consumption of 
bits in the drilling of a well to the depth involved here. 
(TRB pp. 108-109). 
In view of the point relied on in the Davis Brief, 
Emsco also questions the materiality of the staten1ent 
in that brief that: "Walker-Wilson did not complete 
their drilling contract, and Davis had to go in and com-
plete the work. Davis suffered damages running into 
several thousand dollars over and above the contract 
price." (Davis' brief pp. 5 and 6). 
With respect to the Cross appeal of Emsco against 
Davis, for the sake of brevity, Emsco hereby incorporates 
herein, the statement of facts set forth in the brief of 
Stanton. (Case No. 8951). In addition, the record shmYs 
the following facts: 
Pursuant to the contract of Dece1nber 9, 1956, be-
tween Walker-\Yilson Drilling Con1pany and Davis to 
drill the well in question, Walker-\Yilson established a 
line of credit whereby Emsco agreed to furnish \Yalker-
Wilson Drilling Company such 1naterials on a credit basis 
as 1night be needed to drill said well. (TR~\_ pp. 40-43). 
Pursuant to the establislnnent of this line of credit 
and during the time said well ,,~as being drilled, En1sco 
furnished 1naterials to the \Yalker-\Yilson Drilling Com-
pany from their store in Fannington, X ew :Jiexico. These 
materials can be divided into two classifications: First, 
rock drilling bits "·hieh are referred to above and, second, 
materials, such as parts for the drilling rig, n1ore particu-
]arly identified b~T Eu1sco's exhibits A-5, R, Y. I, A-23. 
A-19, H, A-18, A-10, A-15, G, A-11, A-20, A-1±, A-22, .A-21, 
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N, Y, P, A-24, X, W, J, A-7, Q, T, S, U, A-8, K, A-6, L, 
A-2, Z, A-1, A-3 and M, and which materials are adapted 
to, required, and are expendable in the operation of the 
drilling rig. ( TRA pp. 83-91, TRB pp. 25-26). 
It is the ite1ns in the second classification which are 
the subject matter of this cross appeal of Emsco. With 
reference to these items, some of the materials, valued 
in the sum of $371.62, were delivered by Emsco to em-
ployees of the Driller working at the well in question at 
Emsco's store in Farmington, New Mexico (Emsco's 
Exhibits Q; R; S; Counter Order Slip No. 278192, a 
part of Emsco's Exhibit I; Counter Order Slips Nos. 
278191 and 278251, parts of Emsco's Exhibit K). Some 
of these materials, having a value of $1,082.81, were de-
livered at Cortez, Colorado, to Mr. F. L. Wilson, the tool 
pusher or foreman of the Driller on the rig drilling the 
well in question. (Counter Order Slips Nos. 388334, 338-
188, 156476, parts of Emsco's Exhibit G; Counter Order 
Slips Nos. 388479 and 388372, parts of Emsco's Exhibit 
H; Counter Order Slips Nos. 388090 and 388165, parts 
of Emsco's Exhibit K; Counter Order Slips Nos. 388201, 
388460, 388462 and 388436, parts of Emsco's Exhibit N; 
Emsco's Exhibit A-18; A-10; A-15; A-23; A-19; A-7; A-8; 
A-ll; A-14; A-22; A-21; TRB pp. 28-29, 32-36, 42-44. 
The balance of these items, having a value in the sum of 
$1,155.77, were delivered to the location of the well in 
San Juan 'County, State of Utah, by Ems co. (Counter 
Order Slips Nos. 388056 and 278357, parts of Emsco's 
Exhibits I; Counter Order Slips Nos. 278460, 278412, and 
278353, parts of Emsco 's Exhibit K; Counter Order Slip 
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No. 164012, a part of Emsco's Exhibit L; ·Counter Order 
Slips Nos. 278494, 278492, 278493 and 278495, parts of 
Emsco's Exhibit M; Emsco's Exhibits A-5; V; Y; P; W; 
T; U; A-6; Z; A-1 through A-3; TRB pp. 37-43). 
ARGUMENT 
IN ANSWER TO DAVIS' POINT NO. 1, ONE WHO FUR-
NISHES ROCK DRILLING BITS USED IN THE DRILLING 
OF AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN ON SAID 
WELL UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION .38-1-3, 
(UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953) FOR THE REASONABLE 
VALUE OF THE USE OF SAID BITS. 
It appears to be the contention of Davis that the 
word "material" as used in Section 38-1-3, ""CCA, 1953, 
does not e1nbrace the rock drilling bits furnished by Em-
sco under the facts of this case. 
as 
In common usage the word material has been defined 
"The apparatus or imple1uents necessary to 
the doing of anything." 
as well as 
"The substance or substances, or the parts, 
goods, stock, or the like, of which anything is com-
posed or n1ay be made." ( 'Yebster's ~ ew Interna-
tional Dietimuu~·. Second Edition, P. 1514.) 
Thus we see there is nothing inherent in the word 
''material" which excludes iten1s which are used in the 
drilling of an oil or gas well even though they do not be-
conle a pennanent attaehment to the well. The ultimate 
question then, is whether or not the legislature intended 
to give a lien for the use of the iten1s such as the rock bits, 
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which are used in the drilling of the well until they be-
come dull, and thus have no further value as an instru-
ment of drilling until the cutting teeth are replaced. 
Admittedly the cases from the various states are not 
uniform in their rulings with respect to the general ques-
tion of the lienability of the rental value of equipment 
furnished for use in drilling an oil and gas well. It is the 
contention of Ems co that (a) the rule which allows the 
lien is the better view and is more consistent with the 
wording of the Utah Statute and (h) the terms under 
which the bits involved here were furnished and the use 
made of them is different from the ordinary lease situa-
tion, and even under the strictest view, the value of that 
use is lienable. 
The more liberal rule is set forth in l'Villiam JJJ. 
Graham OiJl and Gas Company v. Oil Well Supply, 128 
Okla., 201, 264 P. 591, wherein the Court said: 
"One other item not listed above, contained 
in the account of the Oil Well Supply Company, is 
also challenged as being nonlienable. This is an 
item of $8.75 in an account of $31,167.37, repre-
senting one day's rental of certain necessary drill-
ing tools furnished to and used by lessees. Defend-
ants in their attack thereon rely on the case of 
Arkansas Fuel Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 
P. 717, wherein it was held in paragraph 5 of the 
syllabus, that 'One who rents 'fishing tools' to the 
owner of an oil or gas lease, at a stipulated price 
per day, for the use of such tools on a 'fishing job' 
is not entitled to a lien for the rental value thereof, 
under the sections 7 464-7 466, Comp. St. 1921.' 
"And where, in the body of the opinion in 
reference to the principle announced, it was said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'With reference to the lien of the Acme Fishing 
Tool Company, we are of opinion the court erred 
in rendering judgment establishing a lien in its 
favor. This company neither furnished labor nor 
materials, but this was purely a rental contract of 
certain tools with which to do a fishing job, and 
does not fall within the purview of the statute.' 
"We think that to be a restricted or lilnited 
interpretation of the word 'furnish' used to ex-
press the legislative will, as there is no legislative 
manifestation in the Statute indicating an inten-
tion that the term should be given an interpreta-
tion other than that of its ordinary meaning.' 
Words used in any statute are to be understood 
in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary 
intention plainly appears, and except also that the 
words hereinafter explained are to be understood 
as thus explained.' Section 3528, C.O.S. 1921. 
"The word 'furnish' is not one of the words 
'hereinafter explained.' In its ordinary sense, the 
term means to supply a thing for use in the ac-
complishment of a particular purpose. This may 
be either by sale absolute or by hire at a specified 
rate. The rental plan is not new to the oil industry 
as is shown by the case relied on, and the case of 
U. S. Supply Co. v. Andrews, 71 Okla. 293, 176 P. 
967, referred to therein. The interpretation of the 
law there made in that respect is inharmonious 
with the broad application of the statute 1nade to 
other phases of the case, and is not consonant with 
the prior decisions of this Court where lien laws 
were involved. To hold that statnte gi res to the 
one a lien for commodities furnished 1ch ich become 
a part of the prope1·ty, either by consumption in 
the usc thereof, or by attachntent as a part of the 
equipment or machinery or othenoise, and that it 
denies to the other who likewi,se furnished com-
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modities equally as essentval and necessary as 
furnished by the one, though srttch comnwdit.ies 
furnished by the other be not consrttmed nor be-
come a part of the properties developed by attach-
ment, and retain ivndividuality, and be capable of 
further use upon completion of the immediate pur-
poses for whi·ch they were purchased, it is to say 
that the lawmaking body of the state acted in a 
most discriminatory manner in the enactment of 
the statute, when it is known as a matter of com-
mon knowledge that a large quanti·ties of such 
necessary .and essential conunoditiJes, never be-
come a part of the leasehold either by consumption 
or attachment thereto. In the language of Kansas 
City Southern Ry Co. v. Wallace, supra; 'The 
Legislature that would make a discrimination at 
once so unjust and unreasonable would, in the very 
act lay at its door an impeachment for besotted-
ignorance or gross partiality.' 
"We are unwilling to make this intiination. 
In our view, therefore, we think the language of 
the statute was answered when the challenged 
items were furnished under the line of credit es-
tablished by the agreement of the parties and em-
ployed in the development of the leaseholds in-
volved, and to keep in repair the machinery and 
equipment used in the operation thereof, we there-
fore conclude that the items in question are lien-
able. The case of Arkansas Fuel Company v. Mc-
Dowell, supra, in so far as the same is in conflict 
with the conclusions here reached upon this phase 
of the cause at bar, is hereby expressly over-
ruled." (Emphasis added). 
(See also Standard Pipe and Supply Co. v. Red Rock 
Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d 897, 135 P. 2d 659.) 
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On the other hand, the 1nore restrictive view is set 
forth in the Kansas cases of Wilkinson v. P.acifvc Mid-
West Oil Co., 152 Kan. 712, 107 P. 2d 726, which involved 
the rental of well casing, and Bridgeport Machine Co. v. 
M cK nab, 136 Kan. 781, 18 P. 2d 186, wherein the type 
of tools rented is not set forth. 
The other Kansas cases cited in the brief of Davis 
do not in'lll 1 VE:~ the Eenability of rental at all, but of the 
purchase price of equipment used in equipping a string 
of tools· used in drilling the well (Jlarion Jlach. Co. v. 
Allen, 119 Kan. 770, 2±1 P. 450), and of "miscellaneous 
equipment of a drilling company used on this well today 
and on another tomorrow, such as 'bull rope, belt, wrench, 
hammer, water pail, sandline reel and drilling line.'" 
(Given v. Campbell, 127 Kan. 378, 273 P. -1-!2.) The Court, 
in these cases, considered that there was a lack of rela-
tionship between the benefit conferred on the particular 
well and the an1ount of the lien cla.llned, as is evidenced 
hy the following language from Gireu r. Campbel!, supra: 
"Now, it is perfectly obvious that if tlris well 
were drilled to cmnpletion, these articles would 
not becmne fixtures of the leasehold. They \Yould 
<"onstitute no part of the i1nprove1nent of tl1e P1'011-
PrtY. TheY will be carried awaY and used on a 
sec.ond and third drilling job, and so on 1mtil they 
are worn out. Should appellee's leasehold be sub-
ject to a lien for the paynwnt of this rope, belt, 
wrench, hmnmer, pail, sand line. and drilling line? 
If so, will plaintiffs' leasehold alone be subject to 
a lien therefor, or will all the leaseholds in the 
cmnmunity on which these chattels are successive-
ly used until they are worn out be likewise sub-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
jected to appellant's lien claiin for their payment? 
Why should a vendor's lien be granted on an 
interest in realty for the price of a wrench, a hanl-
mer, or a water pail purchased for the use of the 
driller of an oil and gas well when no such lien 
is granted for the purchase price of a carpenter's 
hammer, a plumber's wrench, or a plasterer's 
water pail similarly used in the construction of 
any other improvement on realty~" 
Fees v. Ritchey, 136 Kan. 221, lc1 P. 2d 652, involved 
the question of rental of casing but does not decide the 
issue of lienability because it holds that the person fur-
nishing the pipe was paid by accepting an interest in 
the well. 
Bridgport Iv.Iachine Co. ?;. lllcKnab, supra, is the 
decision which established the rule in Kansas that rent 
for the use of tools used in an oil or gas well is not 
lienable and that case cites as authority for that propo-
sition Road Supply & Metal Co. v. Bechtelheimer, 119 
Kan. 560, 240 P. 846, and Arkansas F1tel Oil Co. v. 
McDowell, 119 Okla. 77, 249 P. 717. 
The Arkansas Fuel O~l Co. case was and had been 
overruled by the William M. Graham Oil ,and Gas Co. 
case, referred to above, at the time the Bridgport case 
was decided so that the only existing authority cited 
therein is the Road Supply & Metal Co. case. 
Thus the Kansas rule had its inception in the latter 
decision which held that the rental of grading machinery, 
tools and implements used in building a road were not 
"material" because: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
"Material, within the meaning of our statute, 
is that which enters into, becomes a part of, and 
remains with the completed work." (Road Supply 
& Metal Co. v. Bechtelhei1ner, supra, 119 Kan. at 
page 563, 240 P. at page 847.) 
Clayton v. Bridgeport ill ach. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 
33 S.vV. 2d 787, does contain some dicta to the effect that 
the word "materials" under the Texas decisions does not 
include the rental of tools. It defines "supply" as: 
·• Available aggregate of things needed or de-
manded, * * * anything yielded or offered to meet 
a want.'' 
The definition of "material" found in \Yebster's 
Dictionary set forth above as •·the apparatus or imple-
ments necessary to the doing of anything" is not ma-
terially different from the definition of "supply" in the 
Clayton Case. 
Section 68-3-11, (t:.C.~l. 1953), provides: 
.. \Y ords and phrases are to be construed ac-
cording to the context and the aproved usage of 
the language~ but teclmieal words and phrases, 
and such others as have acquired a peculiar and 
appropriate 1neaning in law. or are defined by 
statute, are to be construed according to such 
peculiar and appropriate 1neaning or definition.'' 
(See Cache Auto Co. v. Centra! Garage, 63 Utah 
10, 221 P. 862). 
Frmn the foregoing it is apparent that there is 
nothing in the "approved usage" of the word "1naterial" 
which requires that it "enter into, become a part of, and 
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rmnain with the completed work" as required under 
the Kansas definition. 
In fact, the "context" of the word "material" in the 
Utah lien statute (Section 38-1-3, U.C.A., 1953) negatives 
that requirement. The language of the statute with re-
spect to the "furnishing" of "material to be used in the 
construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, 
any ... iinprovements upon land" provides that the per-
son so furnishing said materials shall have a lien "upon 
the property" on which they have furnished the materials. 
(Emphasis added.) Under this provision there may be 
some merit to the contention that there must be a per-
manent attachment of the items for which a lien is 
claimed. The items must be "used in" the "construction,'' 
etc. of the "improvement." Had our legislature intended 
the restrictive meaning claimed by Davis and announced 
in the Kansas cases, to be applied to oil and gas wells 
in this state, it would have used this same language with 
respect to an oil and gas well when making the 1933 
amendment referred in the brief of Stanton in Case No. 
8951. Instead, there is a complete absence of any require-
ment that the materials be "used in the construction or 
alteration of, or addition to" the well. By the use of dif-
ferent language, a completely new standard or test is 
substituted, so that the question is whether or not the 
materials are "furnished for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any ... oil or gas well," 
not whether the materials were "used in the construction 
of" or "additions to" the well. Who can doubt that 
Emsco, in furnishing the rock bits which actually cut the 
A 
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hole or well here involved, furnished them for the "pros-
pecting" and "development" of the well and actually con-
tributed to the drilling or "prospecting" and "develop-
ment" of the well, the value of the use of said bits in the 
sum of $4,158.64. Is the bit any less furnished for the 
prospecting and development of the well because it is 
returned to Emsco after the cutter teeth have served their 
useful life. 
Further, it is submitted that even under- the Kansas 
rule requiring permanent attachment by complete con-
sumption of the items, the value of the use of the bits 
is lienable. To the extent that a charge is made therefore, 
the bits were consumed, that is, the teeth were worn 
away. The bits become useless, until the teeth are re-
placed. This is not the usual rental situation where the 
amount of the rent is based upon the time the equipment 
is used. Here the time the bits are used is immaterial. 
They can be kept and used until worn out, and even re-
tipped, and the charge remains the san1e, so that the 
charge made is actually for the wearing out of the bit. 
(TRAP. 71). 
In vie\\· of the foregoing, the cases cited by Davis 
announcing the general Yiew that rental charges for 
equipment are not lienable under the general1nechanic's 
lien laws, are not applicable. 
It should be noted that the two Kansas decisions 
relied upon b:· Davis (lT'ilkinson r. Pacific 11lid-West 
Oil Co. supra, and Brid.f!cport J!acl1ine Co. r. illcltnab, 
supra) do not detennine the lienability of iteins such 
as rock drilling bits, the practical utility of which is 
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consumed so that there is a direct relationship between 
the amount of the lien claim and the benefit conferred. 
That said relationship is present here is evidenced by the 
testimony of Davis' Witness Ed Karns that although it is 
impossible to estimate exactly how many bits will be used 
in a well there was nothing unusual about the fact that 
the Driller used $4,158.64 worth of bits in drilling the well 
in question. (TRB pp. 108-109). 
In fact, the Kansas Court has indicated that the ma-
terials need not he completely consumed in allowing a 
lien for the lumber used in the concrete forms in the 
construction of a building even though they were re-
moved and did not actually become a part of the building. 
(Chicago Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 89 Kan. 308, 131 P. 
563). The Court said in that case : 
"Here the material was used in the erection 
of the building, and it became temporarily a part 
of the foundations of the building. Its use was 
provided for in the plans for the building, and 
was included in the contract of the parties. By 
its use most of the material was destroyed or 
rendered unfit for any other practical use. One 
witness said that lumber so used became water-
soaked, twisted, and practically valueless, and 
that architects now generally provided in their 
specifications that new lumber should be used 
for such forms. Some of the thicker or dimension 
lumber was not destroyed, and that much of it 
was used for other purposes. For this a credit of 
$88 was allowed. However, one of the contractors 
said that they would have been as well off if they 
had thrown it aside, and procured new lumber. 
The material having been provided for in the 
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contract, and having been used and practically 
consumed in the erection of the building, can it be 
held to be lienable under the law or can the surety 
company be held liable for such material~ 
"In our opinion the authorities last cited 
state the true rule of liability. The mechanic's 
lien, although unknown to the common la\v, is 
not to be given a narrow and strict construction. 
It is intended as an enlargement of the rights of 
those who furnish labor and material, and who 
cannot conveniently protect themselves in any 
other way. It is a general and remedial statute, 
and the rule that statutes in derogation of the 
common law shall be strictly construed does not 
apply to it. Gen. Stat. 1909, 9850. On the contrary, 
such statutes are to he liberally construed with a 
view of advancing the beneficent purposes which 
the Legislature was seeking to accomplish by 
the enactment. Lumber Co. v. Water Co. 48 Kan. 
182, 29 Pac. 476, 15 L.R.A. 652, 30 Aln. St. Re. 301. 
A reasonable interpretation of our statutes, we 
think, fairly includes the material used and con-
sumed in the erection of the concrete walls. J._s 
counsel for appellee says: 'This is coming to he 
an age of concrete. Great Concrete buildings are 
constantly being erected in all our cities. Several 
thousands of dollars worth of lun1ber \\ill be 
frequently used up for forn1s in the erection of 
a single building. And architects and contractors 
must include such lumber as specifications and 
contracts as an inevitable part of the cost.' The 
material in the forms furnished by appellee was 
understood by all to be a necessary part of the 
construction of the building. For a ti1ne these 
fonns were an essential part of the walls, col-
umns, and partitions. They were provided for in 
the contract, and their character was included in 
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the specifications. While the walls were hardening 
they were as essential to the structure as the 
cement and sand which remained in the walls in 
a different form after the work was completed. 
These forms operated to enhance the value of the 
land on which they were used as did the labor in 
setting them up. They were finally taken down 
and removed, but the life and substance of the 
material had been used up in the erection of the 
building. The material cannot be regarded as a 
part of the contractors' plant because it was im-
pregnated with cement, and rendered practically 
unfit for other uses. It was used directly in the 
construction of the building, and, being consumed 
in that use, it can be fairly said that within the 
meaning of our statute it entered into and was 
used in the erection of the building. It is clear 
that it came within the terms of the bond as it was 
'material furnished and used in and about said 
contract work'." (Emphasis added) 
The same could be said of the rock bits furnished 
by Emsco in this case. After they were returned, they 
were dull and their life and substance had been used up 
in the drilling of the well. They were unfit for further 
use as an instrument of drilling, and thus were practi-
cally consumed. They were certainly understood by all 
to be an essential part of the drilling of the well. 
STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED ON IN 
CROSS APPEAL 
POINT I 
ONE WHO FURNISHES MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR 
THE OPERATION OF A DRILLING RIG USED TO DRILL 
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED 1TO A LIEN FOR THE VALUE 
--~-~- .. , _______________ _ 
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OF THE MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER SECTION 38-
1-3 (Utah Code Annotated) 1953. 
(a) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND WORDING OF 
STATUTES SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION. 
(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE 
HELD THAT THESE MATERIALS ARE LIENABLE. 
(c) THE UTAH LIEN STATUTES IS TO BE CON-
STRUED LIBERALLY TO EFFECT 'THE OBJE.CT 
OF THE STATUTE. 
ARGUI\IENT 
POINT I 
ONE WHO FURNISHES MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR 
THE OPERATION OF A DRILLING RIG USED TO DRILL 
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A LIEN FOR THE VALUE 
OF THE MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER SECTION 38-
1-3 (Utah Code Annotated) 1953. 
(a) LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND WORDING OF 
STATUTES SUPPORT THIS CONCLUSION. 
As with the question of transportation as set forth 
in the Brief of Stanton in Case X o. 8951, the question 
of the lienability of these ite1ns is one of first iiupression 
in this State. The decision of the lower Court ·was that 
these items were not lienable because they were part of 
the drilling rig and the value for which the lien is claimed 
was not consumed in the drilling of the well, but 1night 
be used in other wells as well. (See TRB p. 114). 
Emsco hereby incorporates by reference the section 
of the brief of Stanton in Case No. 8951 with respect to 
the legislative wording and history of the Statutes found 
on pages 8 to 14 inclusive of said brief. It is submitted 
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that the same broad construction claimed by Stanton 
with respect to those "who shall do work for" the pros-
pecting, development, preservation or working of an oil 
well applies to those "who furnish matervals" for the 
same purpose. 
It should be noted that the difference in n1eanings 
between the words "used ,in" found in the fore part of the 
statute with respect to 1naterials furnished for in1prove-
ments on land and the words "for the prospecting, de-
velopment, preservation or working" used with respect 
to an oil well indicates that there is no requirements with 
respect to an oil well that the materials be "used in" the 
well, but only that they be furnished "for the prospecting, 
development or working" of the well. 
The materials in question were furnished for the 
latter purpose and the well could not have drilled without 
them. 
(b) CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE 
HELD THAT THESE MATERIALS ARE LIENABLE. 
Inasmuch as there are no cases construing the Utah 
Lien Statute with respect to this question, a discussion of 
cases from other jurisdictions construing their particular 
Statutes which are no more comprehensive in their pur-
view than the Utah Statute is helpful. 
The Oklahoma case of William M. Graham Oil and 
Gas Co. v. Oil Well Supply, supra, holds that such items 
are lienable. The material facts in that case as stated by 
the court are as follows: 
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"This account (of the lien claimant) had its 
inception upon the application of one of the Les-
sees for a line of credit from this plaintiff where-
under materials, machinery and supplies were to 
be furnished when and as required and needed by 
the Lessees in the due course of the development 
and improvement of their leaseholds. There was 
no definite agreement upon the quantity of the 
particular commodities, the total cost thereof, the 
particular lease or leases to be developed, nor as 
to the number of proposed wells, or other improve-
ments with their location. The only definite under-
standing between the parties was that the Lessees 
were the owners of leaseholds situated in Osagee 
County, and that for the development thereof the 
line of credit was granted." 
After discussing other aspects of the case, the court 
said: 
"This brings us to the crux of the case, which 
involves the application of Section 7 46-1, C.O.S. 
1921, as it then existed, by "\Yhich the rights of the 
parties must be measured, both as to the liena-
bility of the many items constituting the accounts 
and the rank to be accorded se\eral lien estab-
lished thereunder. The relevant part of said sec-
tion upon the first phase is as follows: 
'Any person, corporation, or co-partnership, 
who shall, under contract express or implied, with 
the owner of an~~ leasehold for oil or gas purposes 
or the owner of an~~ gas pipeline or oil pipeline or 
with the trustee or agent of such owner. perform 
labor or furnish Inaterials, InachinerY and oil well 
supplies used in the digging, drilling, torpedoing, 
completing, operating or repairing of any gas well, 
shall have a lien upon the whole of such leasehold 
or oil pipeline, or gas pipeline, or lease for oil and 
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gas purposes, the buildings and appurtenances, 
and upon the materials and supplies so furnished 
and upon the oil or gas well for which they were 
furnished, and upon all other oil or gas purposes 
upon the leasehold for which said material and 
supplies were furnished.' 
"In this connection, our attention necessarily 
is first directed to the meaning of the language 
employed declaratory of the lien provided for. 
Defendants urge the view that the word 'used' in 
the phrase 'used in the digging, drilling, torpedo-
ing, completing, operating, or repairing of any oil 
or gas well,' constitutes a limitation upon the lien-
ability of any items involved such as do not in fact 
become a part of the equipment necessary for the 
operation of the properties, either by consumption 
or attachment, although they be essential instru-
mentalities in the process of both development and 
operation .... 
"To follow defendants' contentions would 
mean that the language of our statute must be 
given a restricted or limited interpretation. 
"The items here challenged consist of supplies 
such as repairs for moveable personal property 
usde by Lessees in improvement and operation 
of properties, repair parts for truck, floor sweep-
ers, snatch block bailer, wire and nails, padlocks, 
oil cans, machine bolts, flash lights, hatchets, han-
dles, hammer handles, wrench jaws, telegraph 
cords, hammer, pipe reamer, bit gauge, manilla 
cable, emery paper, files, scissors, flashlight bat-
teries, spoke for tractor, cave watcher, water 
buckets, barracks brooms, square, ax handle, aug-
ers, chisels, hand saw, drilling tools, parts for 
drilling machine, drill cable, wire rope, bull rope, 
soft wire line, punch, pulling machine, tube catcher 
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and spudding shoe for use in development, opera-
tion and maintenance of the properties involved. 
In our view, the language in the statute is not 
susceptible of either a limited construction or ap-
plication ''Tith respect to the challenged items, for 
it is self-declaratory in that any labor, supplies, 
materials, machinery, 'used' in the digging, drill-
ing, torpedoing, completing or repairing of any 
oil or gas well is comprehended and lienable. That 
such items must become a part of the property 
by either consumption or attachment is not the 
basis of the law; it is the use thereof. The term 
'used' in its common meaning and acceptation, 
according to Lexicons means the employment of 
the thing for the accomplishment of a particular 
purpose. X o tenn of liLritation Y.Tas empbyed ~JY 
the Legislature, if it was the intention that the 
language of the statute was to have a restricted 
interpretation. . . . 
"'V e also take judicial notice of the fact that 
upon the ground of common knowledge that the 
challenged ite1ns are essential and necessary sup-
plies used in the develop1nent and operation of 
properties in an industn- of the first magnitude, 
which of itself, attracts the attention of capital 
and invites and induces inveshnent of large sum5 
of money, as was done in the case at bar.·· 
It is subnlitted that the Oklahmna rule is n10st con-
sistent \Yith the broad 1neaning of the Utah Statute. 
(c) THE UTAH LIEN STATUTES IS TO BE CON-
STRUED LIBERALLY TO EFFECT 'THE OBJECT 
OF THE STATUTE. 
For the sake of brevity. E1nsco incorporates herein 
by reference the Section of the Brief of Stanton in Case 
No. 8951 dealing "·ith this proposition at pages ~0 to 22. 
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It is respectully submitted that the roek bits were 
furnished under circumstances within the contemplation 
of the Utah lien statute and the trial court did not err in 
allowing Emsco a lien for the value of the use of those 
bits in drilling the well in question in the sum of $4,158.64 
and that the judgment of the trial court to that extent 
should be affirmed. It is further submitted that the same 
statute is broad enough to cover the other materials fur-
nished by Emsco and the trial court did err in denying 
the lien of Emsco for the balance of the materials fur-
nished and the judgment of the trial court to that extent 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADA~IS & ANDERSON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Re~ 
spondents, Continental Emsco 
Company, a divi·sion of 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Company, a corporatvon . 
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